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1 |  INTRODUCTION
Empirical evidence reported by Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey (1996) that foreign direct investment 
leads to higher wage payments has sparked a lot of interest among economists and has started a new 
strand of empirical research in international trade, documenting the existence of a foreign ownership 
wage premium (Girma, Greenaway, & Wakelin, 2001; Lipsey & Sjöholm, 2004; Velde & Morrissey, 
2003). With access to detailed firm-level data, the causal relationship between foreign ownership and 
wage premia has become an important topic in this strand of research over the last decade (Balsvik, 
2011; Girma & Görg, 2007; Heyman, Sjöholm, & Tingvall, 2007). This paper provides new evidence 
for a foreign ownership wage premium in Germany.
We contribute to the literature in two important ways. First, we estimate the foreign ownership 
wage premium in Germany, using a longitudinal linked employer–employee data set that covers an 
observation window spanning the years 2003–14. This long time span not only allows us to separate 
the impact effect of foreign takeover in the period of ownership change from lagged adjustment ef-
fects in subsequent years, but also to estimate the foreign ownership wage premium by skill groups. 
Second, we test three channels put forward by previous research, which give rise to a foreign owner-
ship wage premium. In particular, we consider rent appropriation by managers, technology protection 
and training on new technology as distinct arguments justifying the existence of a foreign ownership 
wage premium. Finally, we control for an export platform motive of foreign takeover to ensure that our 
estimates do not accidentally pick up an exporter wage premium.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License, which permits use, distribution 
and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited and is not used for commercial purposes.
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To estimate a causal effect of foreign takeover on wages paid by German establishments, we com-
bine propensity-score matching with a difference-in-difference estimator. We associate the probability 
of a worker in our sample to be treated—defined by staying in an establishment acquired by a foreign 
investor—with the product of two probabilities: the probability that the employer is target of a foreign 
takeover and the probability of the worker to remain employed in the same establishment. As both, 
worker and establishment characteristics, matter for the treatment, we follow Martins (2004) and 
Hijzen, Martins, Schank, and Upward (2013) and combine establishment information with data on 
worker characteristics in the propensity-score matching. To construct our control group, we match to 
each treated worker the nearest observational neighbour from establishments that are not subject to 
foreign takeover.
Using a difference-in-difference approach, we then shed light on the effect of treatment on wages 
distinguishing between an impact effect in the year after takeover and a lagged adjustment effect aris-
ing in the second and the third year after takeover. We use data from the year prior to acquisition to de-
termine the control group and build our analysis on a four-year window around the takeover. Because 
we rely on takeover events from different years, choosing the same four-year observation window for 
all acquisitions is important (see Egger, Egger, & Greenaway, 2008). In our baseline specification, 
we estimate an average wage premium from foreign takeover of 4.0 log points, which further grows 
to 6.3 log points 3 years after ownership change. When analysing the impact of ownership change 
for different skill groups, we find that the wage premium is larger for high-skilled than for low- and 
medium-skilled workers. We also provide evidence that foreign takeover exerts a lagged adjustment 
effect particularly on the wages of medium- and high-skilled workers.
To shed light on the economic mechanisms that can explain a foreign ownership wage premium, 
we rely on insights from previous research and distinguish three arguments. First, managers receive 
a higher remuneration after a successful acquisition (see Heyman, Sjöholm, & Tingvall, 2011). If 
rent appropriation by managers plays a role, we would expect to find a transitory increase in manager 
wages. Second, as a result of knowledge transfer by the investor, foreign takeover may lead to the use 
of new technology requiring training of workers (see Fosfuri, Motta, & Rønde, 2001; Görg, Strobl, & 
Walsh, 2007). If training of workers requires time, we would expect to observe a lagged adjustment 
of wages. Third, foreign-owned plants may have an incentive to protect their technology by reducing 
knowledge dissipation through worker turnover (see Glass & Saggi, 2002). Workers should thus re-
ceive wage premia as long as foreign-owned plants possess a technology advantage.
Using information on manager status and product as well as process innovation, we analyse these 
different explanations empirically and find support for the relevance of all three channels. Our results 
also indicate that none of the considered channels can simultaneously explain the immediate wage 
premium in the year after takeover and the lagged adjustment effect in consecutive periods. Because 
previous research suggests that an important motive for foreign investment can be market access in 
nearby countries, we also account for the initial export status of acquired plants to control for an export 
platform motive. We thus ensure that the estimated wage premia do not incorrectly pick up an exporter 
wage premium due to an expansion of trade with Eastern Europe after the millennium (cf. Dauth, 
Findeisen, & Suedekum, 2014).1 Since the estimated wage premium from foreign takeover does not 
differ for initial exporters and non-exporters, this concern seems not to be justified.
1 The platform argument has been put forward by Motta and Norman (1996), Yeaple (2003), Ekholm et al. (2007), and Neary 
(2009) as an important motive for foreign investment. It has been used to explain the finding that foreign investment 
increased in times of falling trade costs. Bernard and Bradford Jensen (1999, 1995) were the first providing evidence that 
exporters pay higher wages than non-exporters. The existence of an exporter wage premium has been empirically confirmed 
by Schank et al. (2007) and Wagner (2007).
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We complement our empirical analysis by three extensions. First, we analyse whether wages in-
crease because it takes time before the full effect of foreign takeover materialises, or because foreign 
takeover affects not only the wage level but also the wage growth of workers in German plants. To 
distinguish between these two interpretations, we expand the observation window around the takeover 
events to 6 years. Our results indicate that the growth of wages, which we observe after ownership 
change, is temporary and washes out after 4 years. Moreover, our results indicate that reaching the 
full effect of foreign takeover on wages takes longer for high-skilled workers. Second, we investigate 
whether foreign takeover causes a persistent wage increase that lasts even after divestment and (re-)
acquisition of a foreign-owned plant by a German investor. We find support for a persistent effect, con-
sistent with the view that foreign investment provides a one-time knowledge transfer and a permanent 
improvement of technology. In a third extension, we conduct a placebo test and estimate the effect 
of a takeover of German plants by German investors. For low- and medium-skilled workers, we find 
negative and mostly insignificant effects. For high-skilled workers, we only document insignificant 
estimates. Thus, a wage premium from takeover only exists in our data if the investor comes from 
abroad. Finally, in two sensitivity tests, we show that our results are robust to changes in the matching 
procedure.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the data set and 
present descriptive statistics. In Section 3, we describe our empirical methodology, and in Section 4, 
we present and discuss our estimation results. Section 5 presents extensions of our analysis and robust-
ness checks, and Section 6 concludes.
2 |  DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
For our empirical analysis, we rely on two data sources provided by the Institute for Employment 
Research (IAB). The first data set is the IAB Establishment Panel, which consists of a stratified 1% 
random sample of establishments that employ at least one employee covered by the social security 
system at 30 June each year. Since 1993, the IAB Establishment Panel surveys the same establish-
ments from all industries in West Germany and since 1996 in East Germany. Response rates of repeat-
edly interviewed establishments—which account for about 7% of the German workforce—are above 
80%. From the survey questions, we use information about (change in) plant size, industry affiliation, 
exporting share, location and profitability. Crucial to our analysis, the IAB Establishment Panel also 
provides information on majority ownership of establishments, differentiating between East German, 
West German, foreign and public owners as well as a residual group, for which no majority owner is 
found. Relying on this information, we identify foreign takeover as a change in the majority owner-
ship from German to non-German in two subsequent years.
As a second data set, we use the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB) of the IAB, which 
cover about 80% of the German workforce. This data set contains administrative data on all employ-
ees who are subject to social security contributions. The IEB provides information about age, gender, 
nationality, tenure, occupation, education and the daily wage of workers employed in the plants of the 
IAB Establishment Panel.
The IEB can be linked to the IAB Establishment Panel by a unique identifier, which allows 
constructing a linked employer–employee data set (LIAB) with highly reliable information on 
workers, wages and establishments.2 The IEB does not contain detailed information on hours 
2 For further details on the LIAB, see Alda et al. (2005) and Klosterhuber et al. (2016).
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worked. In addition, since worker information comes from social security records, wages are top-
coded at the social security contribution ceiling. To deal with these drawbacks, we use only full-
time workers aged 16–65  years in our analysis and impute wages above the social security 
contribution ceiling using tobit regressions (see, e.g. Baumgarten, 2013; Dustmann, Fitzenberger, 
Schönberg, & Spitz-Oener, 2014; Gartner, 2004; Schafer, 1997).3 Furthermore, we have informa-
tion on the education level, which is missing or inconsistent for some workers. To mitigate this 
problem, we impute missing or implausible information on education, relying on information from 
previous periods.
Due to the low number of takeovers prior to 2003, we use establishment and worker information 
for the years 2003–14. Furthermore, we concentrate on establishments located in West Germany, be-
cause economic conditions and wages in East Germany still differ substantially from those in West 
Germany. Another reason for focusing on West Germany only is that we want to avoid attributing the 
effects of foreign takeover to more general (wage) adjustments during the ongoing transition and 
catch-up process of East Germany. We also drop establishments, which we do not observe over four 
consecutive years around the takeover. We use information from the year prior to takeover to match 
workers and the 3 years afterwards to distinguish the impact effect in the year after ownership change 
from lagged adjustment effects of foreign acquisition. Because we are interested in the wage impact of 
foreign takeover over a time span of 3 years, we only keep workers employed at an establishment over 
the 4-year time horizon (stayers). We also drop workers changing their education over time or employ-
ees with a monthly wage below the social security threshold.4 Finally, we drop 1% of workers with the 
highest wages in each year to avoid that outliers influence our results.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the key variables used when matching workers from ac-
quired to workers in non-acquired establishments. We identify 152 foreign takeovers and 24,946 
stayers in the acquired establishments over our sample period. The descriptive statistics are in line 
with previous findings that establishments acquired by foreign investors differ from non-acquired 
establishments in various dimensions (see Gelübcke, 2013). Targeted establishments are bigger, more 
prevalent in manufacturing and less prevalent in services than in other industries. Moreover, foreign 
takeover targets exhibit better profits. At the worker level, Table 1 shows that acquired and non-ac-
quired establishments differ slightly with regard to gender and skill composition and that employees 
in establishments that are target of foreign takeover receive higher wages. Overall, the descriptive 
statistics suggest that foreign investors do not choose establishments and their workforce randomly, 
which is why we perform propensity-score matching to deal with selection.
3 |  ESTIMATION STRATEGY
3.1 | Baseline specification
To estimate the effect of foreign acquisition on wages, we use information from a 4-year window 
around a takeover event. Specifically, to construct our control group, we use data one year prior to 
the change in ownership, whereas we use information from 3 years after foreign takeover to distin-
guish the impact effect of ownership change from lagged adjustment effects. Thus, we consider foreign 
3 In 2003, the social security contribution ceiling was 167.67 euro for daily wages and 12.5% of the wages of full-time 
workers are top-coded.
4 The limit was 400 Euro per month from 2003 to 2012 and 450 Euro in 2013 and 2014.
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acquisitions in the years 2004–12. Despite the long observation period, we observe only 152 foreign 
takeovers. To avoid problems from small sample size, we therefore follow Martins (2004), Heyman et 
al. (2007) and Hijzen et al. (2013) and build our analysis on individual worker data. All workers in an 
establishment subject to a foreign takeover are part of the treatment group if they are continuously em-
ployed in the same establishment over the four-year window around ownership change. Accordingly:
defines the treatment indicator Dij which is equal to one if worker i from establishment j that has been 
acquired by a foreign investor between t = 0 and t = 1 stays in this establishment over the period t = 0 
Dij=
{
1 if i employed in j from t=0 to t=3and j foreign−acquired
0 if i employed in j from t=0 to t=3and jdomestic&non−acquired
,
T A B L E  1  Descriptives of key covariates
  Acquired (SD) Non-acquired domestic (SD)
(a) Plant characteristics
Plants 152   6,219  
Plant-years 608   56,052  
Log employment 4.485 (1.726) 3.400 (1.580)
ΔLog employment –0.013 (0.207) 0.014 (0.179)
Agriculture and energy 0.018 (0.133) 0.031 (0.173)
Manufacturing 0.479 (0.500) 0.276 (0.447)
Construction 0.033 (0.179) 0.107 (0.310)
Retail and repair 0.192 (0.395) 0.185 (0.388)
Services and finance 0.278 (0.448) 0.400 (0.490)
Profitability 0.493 (0.500) 0.413 (0.492)
(b) Worker characteristics
Workers 24,946   489,686  
Worker-years 99,784   3,502,568  
Log wage 4.851 (0.463) 4.810 (0.504)
Age 42.8 (9.1) 42.8 (9.5)
Female 0.187 (0.390) 0.197 (0.398)
Low-skilled 0.142 (0.349) 0.123 (0.329)
Medium-skilled 0.744 (0.436) 0.759 (0.427)
High-skilled 0.114 (0.317) 0.117 (0.322)
Notes: Plant characteristics are plant-year averages which are taken from the IAB Establishment Panel survey. Worker characteristics 
are worker-year averages which come from the IEB. ΔLog Employment is the difference in log employment before ownership 
change. We classify workers with no vocational training, no high-school degree (Abitur) or workers lacking education information 
and conducting simple tasks as low-skilled; workers with a high-school degree and/or vocational training or workers lacking 
education information and conducting specialised tasks as medium-skilled; and workers with a degree from a university or a 
university of applied sciences or workers lacking education information and conducting highly complex tasks as high-skilled. 
The dummy variable profitability is one if a plant evaluates its previous profits as very good or good. Further matching variables 
(not listed) are eight West German federal state dummies for Schleswig-Holstein (including Hamburg), Lower Saxony (including 
Bremen), North Rhine-Westphalia, Hesse, Rhineland-Palatinate (including Saarland), Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria and Berlin.
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to t = 3.5 In contrast, the treatment indicator is zero if worker i's plant j remains domestically owned 
over the 4-year observation window, which defines our control group. However, to identify a causal 
effect of foreign takeover on wages, we have to take into account that acquired and non-acquired es-
tablishments differ in several dimensions, including their workforce (see Table 1). Since previous re-
search shows that establishment characteristics and worker characteristics are determinants of both 
foreign takeover (see Bandick & Görg, 2010; Girma & Görg, 2007; Heyman et al., 2007) and wage 
payments (Bayard & Troske, 1999; Idson & Oi, 1999; Winter-Ebmer & Zweimüller, 1999), estimates 
of the effects of foreign takeover that do not account for pre-existing establishment and worker differ-
ences are vulnerable to a selection bias.
To overcome the problem of selection bias, we use nearest-neighbour propensity-score matching to 
define a suitable control group (see e.g. Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). We use the variables reported in 
Table 1 to construct the treatment and control group. To determine the nearest neighbour of a worker 
in the treatment group, we proceed in two steps. We first estimate the probability that a worker i is 
employed in plant j in the year prior to foreign takeover (t = 0) and stays in the plant until year t = 3. 
We then match workers from the treatment group to workers with the smallest absolute distance in 
their propensity scores in the control group.
We model the probability of workers to be treated:
as a function of a vector of establishment-level covariates, Xj,0, and a vector of worker-level covariates, 
Xj,0, measured in period t = 0 (with β, γ the respective vectors of coefficients). Establishment-level covari-
ates include the log of employment to control for plant size and the change in log employment prior to 
takeover to capture business conditions, as well as a dummy that is one if a plant reports very good or good 
profits as proxy for profitability, five sector dummies indicating establishments' industry affiliation and 
eight federal state dummies determining establishments' location.6
Worker-level covariates include information on log wage, age and gender to control for worker het-
erogeneity. Conditioning on worker characteristics prior to an ownership change ensures that we com-
pare two workers—one in a foreign-acquired and the other in a domestic establishment—with similar 
earnings potential before the takeover event. To minimise differences in workers' education level, we 
also match on workers' skill levels. Finally, we match observations from the same year to minimise the 
risk that estimates of the foreign ownership wage premium pick up macroeconomic changes that have 
been quite substantial over the observation period.
Table A1 in the Appendix reports the mean values of the covariates in the treatment and control 
group before and after matching. We also show two diagnostics for evaluating the matching qual-
ity based on individual covariates (see Balsvik & Saethre, 2016; Girma & Görg, 2007; Hijzen et 
al., 2013). The first one is the standardised (percentage) bias put forward by Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1985). The reduction of the mean standardised bias from 14.8% in the unmatched to 4.2% in the 
matched sample indicates a fairly good matching result. As a second diagnostic, we report the nor-
malised difference of covariate means introduced by Imbens and Wooldridge (2009), who suggest an 
upper limit of one quarter to consider a variable as sufficiently balanced. This criterion is fulfilled for 
all of our covariates.
5 Since we do not know the exact date of ownership change, we refer to period t = 0 as the year prior to takeover and to period 
t = 1 as the year after takeover.
(1)P
(
Dij=1
)
=Φ
(
훽 ⋅Xj,0+훾 ⋅Xi,0
)
,
6 Due to the low number of affected workers in some federal states, we assign Bremen (538 stayers) to Lower Saxony, 
Saarland (11 stayers) to Rhineland-Palatinate and Hamburg (554 stayers) to Schleswig-Holstein.
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We estimate the causal effect of foreign takeover on the wages of stayers using a difference-in-dif-
ference (DID) approach. We estimate the treatment effect separately for the year after a foreign take-
over and the two subsequent years using a baseline DID model of the following form:
where wijt is the log daily wage of worker i in plant j and year t after ownership change, αi is a worker-fixed 
effect to control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, and λt is a time-fixed effect.7 Furthermore, 
ds
t
 is a time dummy equal to one if t = s and Dij is the treatment indicator equal to one for each stayer, 
whose plant j has been acquired between t = 0 and t = 1, and zero otherwise. Parameters νs are the coef-
ficients for the interaction term of the time dummies with the treatment indicator. Finally, εijt is the error 
term. Since the estimates of νs represent the wage premium s periods after a worker experiences a foreign 
takeover, Equation (2) allows us to estimate the effect of ownership change at three points in time. Hence, 
we can determine whether the effect of foreign takeover on wages is immediate or takes time to develop 
(see Balsvik & Haller, 2010; Hijzen et al., 2013).
The coefficients νs capture a causal average treatment effect of foreign takeover on workers if the 
following three assumptions hold. The first one is the conditional independence assumption (CIA), 
which states that conditional on the covariates in Table 1 the assignment of workers into treatment and 
control groups is random. We take the CIA into account by matching on establishment characteristics, 
such as establishment size, employment growth, industry, establishments' location and profitability, as 
well as worker characteristics, such as age, gender, skill dummies and the log daily wage.
The second assumption is the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA). In our context, this 
assumption requires that untreated workers' wages are not affected by other workers staying in a for-
eign-acquired establishment. We are confident that the SUTVA holds because the number of foreign 
takeovers compared to the total German establishment population is small (see Table 1). Thus, we do 
not expect an effect of a foreign takeover on the wages of untreated workers, for example due to an 
increase in equilibrium wages for all workers.
Third, in the absence of treatment, the wages of both treated and untreated workers have to follow 
the same path, which is referred to as the common trend assumption (CTA). With data from only one 
pre-acquisition period, it is not possible to test whether the CTA holds prior to takeover (see e.g. Mora & 
Reggio, 2012). However, our matching approach ensures that workers in the treatment and control group 
are similar in their skills as well as their wages prior to acquisition. To the extent that wages of workers 
with similar characteristics follow a common trend in a competitive labour market, it is likely that our 
matching approach does not violate the CTA. As suggested by Pischke (2005), we investigate pre-treat-
ment trends graphically. Since examining a pre-trend requires at least two observations for each worker 
prior to a foreign takeover, we restrict the sample to all matched worker pairs, which we observe from 
period t = −1 to period t = 3. This decreases the sample to 15,581 stayers in 117 foreign-acquired plants.
Figure 1 depicts the wage trend of treated and untreated workers. The graph shows that wages grow 
similarly prior to foreign acquisition and that our matching is successful in eliminating differences in 
average wages between treatment and control group. A test on the equality of means confirms that 
average wages in period t = 0 do not differ significantly between groups. Finally, a simple linear re-
gression of the wage increase between t = −1 and t = 0 additionally shows that the growth in wages 
prior to acquisition is similar. These results suggest that the wage premium from foreign takeover does 
(2)wijt=훼i+휆t+
3∑
s=1
휈s ⋅d
s
t
⋅Dij+휀ijt,
7 Since all workers in our sample are stayers, we cannot estimate a separate establishment fixed effect. Put differently, the 
average worker fixed effect within an establishment is the establishment fixed effect.
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not pick up pre-existing differences in the compositions of treatment and control group. As illustrated 
by Figure 1, workers in establishments that are subject to foreign takeover experience a considerably 
steeper wage profile after ownership changes.
3.2 | Heterogeneity of the foreign wage premium
Combining propensity-score matching with a difference-in-difference approach allows to estimate a 
causal effect of a foreign takeover on wages. However, if the wage premium from foreign takeover 
differs between heterogeneous workers or plants, estimates from the pooled sample are less informa-
tive. From a policy perspective, heterogeneity in the wage premium is particularly relevant if some 
workers benefit from a foreign investment while others lose. There are two approaches to analyse if 
the wage premium varies across workers. First, we can split the sample by observable differences of 
workers and estimate the model in Equation (2) separately for the sub-samples. We follow this ap-
proach to analyse whether pooling over skill groups is justified in our model.
Second, we can include interaction terms in the difference-in-difference regression and estimate a 
model of the following form:
where Ii is an indicator variable for worker i, which is one if worker i belongs to a certain subgroup and 
zero otherwise, and ρijt is an error term. Accordingly, coefficients ηs measure the wage differential s years 
after ownership change for workers with Ii = 1 compared to workers with Ii = 0. πs is the additional wage 
gain s years after acquisiton from foreign takeover between years t = 0 and t = 1 for workers from this 
group. In general, Ii can vary across workers differing in individual characteristics within an establishment 
(such as the manager status) or can be the same for all workers from the same establishment but differ 
between establishments (such as the export status of the employer).
4 |  RESULTS
This section presents results from our difference-in-difference estimation for the matched sample of 
treated and untreated workers. The estimates reported in Table 2 rely on the baseline specification 
(3)wijt=훼i+휆t+
3∑
s=1
휈s ⋅d
s
t
⋅Dij+
3∑
s=1
휂s ⋅d
s
t
⋅ Ii+
3∑
s=1
휋s ⋅d
s
t
⋅Dij ⋅ Ii+휌ijt,
F I G U R E  1  Average wages in treated and matched control group [Colour figure can be viewed at 
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
t = –1 t = 0
4.75
4.85
4.95
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
time
Control group
Treatment group
Acquisition
Log wage
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in Equation (2). In the first column, we report our finding for the pooled sample of all workers. The 
estimates show that workers receive a wage premium of 4.0 log points in the year after ownership 
change, with the wage premium further increasing to 6.3 log points after 3 years. A simple Wald test, 
which compares the equality of coefficients, shows that the difference between the premia in t = 3 and 
t = 1 is significant. These results are similar in size to previous estimates for Germany (see Andrews, 
Bellmann, Schank, & Upward, 2009; Hijzen et al., 2013) and in line with findings from other stud-
ies arguing that the impact of ownership change takes time to develop (see Balsvik & Haller, 2010; 
Hijzen et al., 2013).
Columns (2) to (4) of Table 2 show the estimates of foreign takeover by skill groups. We find that 
the immediate wage impact in the period of ownership change with 3.1 log points is less pronounced for 
low- and medium-skilled workers than for high-skilled workers, who obtain a sizeable wage premium 
of 11.3 log points right after a foreign takeover. This indicates that foreign takeover exerts a stronger 
positive wage effect if workers are better educated. The wage premium of low-skilled workers is pos-
itive but insignificantly different from zero in t = 2 and reaches 2.6 log points in the third year after 
takeover. The wage premium for medium-skilled workers increases to 5.2 log points while the wage 
premium for high-skilled workers noticeably rises to 18.1 log points after 3 years. The differences in 
the wage premia between periods t = 3 and t = 1 for medium- and high-skilled workers are significant. 
Thus, wages even grow stronger after the ownership change—particularly for workers with higher skill 
levels.
With the results in Table 2 at hand, we investigate three main channels highlighted in the liter-
ature explaining positive wage effects of a foreign takeover. A first potential explanation is the rent 
appropriation by managers hypothesis. Evidence for this hypothesis has been put forward by 
Heyman et al. (2011). Using Swedish linked employer–employee data, they find that the foreign 
ownership wage premium for high-skilled workers disappears when additionally controlling for 
individuals' manager status. Manasse and Turrini (2001) discuss a theoretical argument for man-
agers' rent appropriation by arguing that manager income is directly linked to profits, implying that 
this group benefits disproportionately from cross-border activity (see Kong, Kong, Panga, & 
Zhang, 2018, for supportive evidence). In the context of foreign acquisition, incentives for rent 
T A B L E  2  The foreign ownership wage premium
 
All workers Low-skilled Medium-skilled High-skilled
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Acquisition t = 1 0.040*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.113***
  (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.022)
Acquisition t = 2 0.042*** 0.008 0.030*** 0.167***
  (0.012) (0.014) (0.010) (0.028)
Acquisition t = 3 0.063*** 0.026* 0.052*** 0.181***
  (0.014) (0.016) (0.012) (0.030)
Constant 4.780*** 4.641*** 4.763*** 5.062***
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009)
Observations 199,384 28,368 148,352 22,664
Notes: Dependent variable is the log daily wage. The estimation includes time dummies and worker-fixed effects. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the establishment-level. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.
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appropriation by managers exist in particular if performance-based contracts stipulate higher re-
muneration upon successful takeover.8
To investigate to what extent the skill bias in the foreign takeover effect reported in Table 2 cap-
tures differences in the positions of workers with different skill levels in a plant's hierarchy, we esti-
mate the model outlined in Equation (3), in which we additionally interact the treatment indicators 
with the manager status of workers. For this purpose, we use occupation codes from the German no-
menclature in 1988 (KldB 1988) available in the LIAB.9 We convert these codes into the international 
standard classification of occupations (ISCO-88 COM) and, following Caliendo, Monte, and Rossi-
Hansberg (2015), assign employees to three hierarchical layers: workers, supervisors and managers or 
directors. We then refer to managers or directors simply as managers.10 Of course, formal education 
and hierarchical position in a plant are highly correlated. Still, distinguishing between skill groups and 
management status is not the same, because low-skilled workers can be managers of an establishment, 
while high-skilled university graduates can end up working in the production process. In our sample, 
about 13.4% of workers are managers, with the fraction varying between 1.3% among low-skilled 
workers, 7.9% among medium-skilled workers and 63.4% among high-skilled workers. Table 3 sum-
marises the estimation results when additionally taking into account the manager status of workers.
Column (1) in Table 3 shows that the wage premium of 3.1 log points for non-managers is consid-
erably lower than for managers who receive a wage premium of 10.3 log points in the year after acqui-
sition. Similar to the baseline results in Table 2, the wage premium increases for non-managers to 5.1 
log points and for managers to 14.8 log points three periods after the ownership change. This result is 
well in line with the rent appropriation by managers hypothesis.11
Columns (2) to (4) show that for non-managers the initial ranking of wage gains from our baseline 
specification is unaffected with the wage premia ranging from 2.7 to 10.0 log points in the first and 
2.7 to 15.4 log points in the third year after ownership change. Moreover, we find an additional and 
immediate wage gain of 3.5 log points for medium-skilled managers, which stays fairly stable over 
the three-year, post-treatment observation window. Our results for the low-skilled group indicate that 
in the first year after ownership change low-skilled managers receive an additional positive wage 
premium of 6.0 log points. In the second and third year after takeover for low-skilled workers and 
over the whole post-treatment observation window for the group of high-skilled workers, we esti-
mate a positive effect of manager status on the foreign ownership wage premium, which is, however, 
not statistically significant. Summing up our results, we find that after separating the wage gain by 
manager status, wage premia for non-managers decrease in all skill groups—with high-skilled work-
ers still receiving the largest wage increase—but remain economically and statistically significant. 
This differentiates our results from Heyman et al. (2011) and indicates that the rent appropriation by 
8 The rent appropriation by managers hypothesis is also supported by findings that top executives experience a strong income 
increase after a successful acquisition (cf. Schmidt & Fowler, 1990; Datta et al., 2002; Girma et al., 2006). Guest (2009) 
extends the analysis to international acquisitions and shows that the payment increase for managers is temporary. Whereas 
studies on the link between acquisition and manager remuneration typically focus on the effects in acquiring firms, one may 
argue that if there are rents to share, managers of acquired plants should also benefit from a takeover.
9 The occupation codes capture the job a worker currently performs.
10 Accordingly, our manager category comprises workers from ISCO-88 COM codes 111–131 and 211–247.
11 Since most managers are high-skilled (about 55% in our sample), our estimated manager premia could in fact simply 
control for high skills. To make sure that this is not the case, we have estimated an additional specification controlling for 
high-skilled workers and their interaction with the acquisition dummy. This lowers the estimated manager premium but does 
not eliminate it. Also, including a further interaction between acquisition, high-skilled workers, and manager status does not 
change this result.
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manager hypothesis does not provide a satisfying explanation for the skill bias in the wage effects 
reported in Table 2.
In a next step, we investigate to what extent the wage effects reported in Table 2 capture an incen-
tive of firms to reduce job turnover and technology dissipation (technology protection), as argued for 
instance by Glass and Saggi (2002). An incentive to reduce worker turnover exists in particular if the 
acquired plant developed an innovation around the event of foreign takeover. Otherwise, competitors 
could have targeted workers with valuable knowledge from the respective plant already prior to foreign 
acquisition. Such an innovation can be triggered by the investor, because after ownership change firm 
assets are jointly used, which gives the acquired plant access to the know-how of the foreign owner (see 
Barba Navaretti & Vernables, 2004). This technology transfer may be associated with process innova-
tion and evidence for it is provided by Bloom, Genakos, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2012) and Bloom, 
Sadun, and Van Reenen (2012). However, there could also be a product innovation in the acquired plant.
To test this technology protection hypothesis, we investigate both product and process innovation. We 
capture product innovation by a survey question asking if the plant introduced a completely new activity 
or product over the two preceding years. From this question, we derive a dummy variable, which is one 
if a plant reports product innovation in the 2 years prior to takeover and zero otherwise. Thirty of 152 
acquired plants (accounting for 9,975 stayers) report product innovation according to this criterion. Table 
4 reports the results after adding the interaction of this dummy with the treatment indicators to the model 
outlined in Equation (3). In Column (1), we see little evidence for an impact of product innovation on 
the foreign ownership wage premium when considering the pooled sample of all workers—although the 
estimates of the acquisition dummies are somewhat reduced. This picture does not change, when zooming 
in on the subgroups of low- and medium-skilled workers. However, for high-skilled workers the estimated 
foreign ownership premium increases by 7.6–12.6 log point in plants reporting product innovation, with 
T A B L E  3  The foreign ownership wage premium for managers
 
All workers Low-skilled Medium-skilled High-skilled
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Acquisition t = 1 0.031*** 0.027** 0.028*** 0.100***
  (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.028)
Acquisition t = 2 0.032*** 0.008 0.030*** 0.140***
  (0.010) (0.013) (0.009) (0.031)
Acquisition t = 3 0.051*** 0.027* 0.049*** 0.154***
  (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.029)
Manager × acquisition t = 1 0.072*** 0.060* 0.035* 0.014
  (0.019) (0.036) (0.020) (0.034)
Manager × acquisition t = 2 0.087*** 0.033 0.015 0.039
  (0.021) (0.032) (0.018) (0.039)
Manager × acquisition t = 3 0.097*** 0.023 0.036* 0.042
  (0.026) (0.039) (0.022) (0.046)
Constant 4.780*** 4.641*** 4.763*** 5.062***
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009)
Observations 199,384 28,368 148,352 22,664
Notes: Dependent variable is the log daily wage. The estimation includes time dummies and worker-fixed effects. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the establishment-level. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.
   | 313EGGER Et al.
the estimated effects being highly statistically significant. This suggests that concerns of job turnover and 
technology dissipation can explain part of the skill bias in the estimated wage effects of foreign takeover.
To investigate the role of process innovation, we rely on information about new investment and create a 
dummy variable, which is one if a plant reports positive investment in the period of foreign takeover and zero 
otherwise. The idea is that firms with modern technology are more receptive to the know-how provided by 
the new owner. Two-thirds of the acquired plants (accounting for 20,893 stayers) report process innovation 
according to this definition. Table 5 displays the results from estimating Equation (3) when controlling for 
the interaction of the process innovation dummy with the treatment indicators. From these estimates, we see 
that in acquired plants process innovation exerts a statistically significant effect only 3 years after ownership 
change for the subgroup of high-skilled workers. However, the small insignificant coefficient in t = 2 and the 
following increase in t = 3 for high-skilled workers are in line with installment of new technology and train-
ing of the workforce after foreign takeover. This is because according to the training on new technology 
hypothesis, foreign takeover and technology transfer should lead to lagged positive wage effects as training 
to use technology productively takes time (see Fosfuri et al., 2001; Görg et al., 2007).12
12 The lack of strong supportive evidence for technology protection in the context of process innovation could come from using a 
rather imprecise proxy for technology transfer. Therefore, we have run an additional specification, in which we associate positive 
investment with process innovation only if the plant additionally reports expenditures for IT infrastructure. This captures the idea 
that foreign-owned plants use IT more productively or that the foreign owner implements new management practices that may 
require intensive communication with the parent (cf. Bloom et al., 2012; Javorcik & Poelhekke, 2017; Bloom & Van Reenen, 
2010). Using this alternative measure as a proxy for process innovation gives slightly stronger results and significant effects of the 
interaction term for medium- and high-skilled workers. The general picture from Table 5 does not change after this refinement.
T A B L E  4  The foreign ownership wage premium with product innovation
 
All workers Low-skilled Medium-skilled High-skilled
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Acquisition t = 1 0.028*** 0.019* 0.024*** 0.068***
  (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.015)
Acquisition t = 2 0.034*** −0.000 0.028*** 0.113***
  (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.020)
Acquisition t = 3 0.046*** 0.010 0.042*** 0.118***
  (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.023)
Product innova-
tion × acquisition t = 1
0.019 0.013 0.009 0.076**
  (0.017) (0.021) (0.019) (0.030)
Product innova-
tion × acquisition t = 2
0.005 −0.002 −0.010 0.095***
  (0.020) (0.026) (0.018) (0.036)
Product innova-
tion × acquisition t = 3
0.030 0.022 0.015 0.126***
  (0.022) (0.029) (0.021) (0.038)
Constant 4.780*** 4.641*** 4.763*** 5.062***
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
Observations 199,384 28,368 148,352 22,664
Notes: Dependent variable is the log daily wage. The estimation includes time dummies and worker-fixed effects. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the establishment-level. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.
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In a final step, we analyse to what extent the estimated foreign ownership premium actually cap-
tures a wage premium from exporting (see Bernard & Jensen, 1995; Schank, Schnabel, & Wagner, 
2007) because the main reason for the investment decision is a platform motive (export platform 
hypothesis). This concern is of particular relevance for the years after the millennium, because the 
trade literature points to the opening up of Eastern Europe as a historic event providing evidence for 
platform investment (see Ekholm, Forslid, & Markusen, 2007; Motta & Norman, 1996; Neary, 2009). 
To account for the export platform hypothesis, we consider the initial exporter status of establishments 
and interact it with the treatment indicator. The exporter dummy is one if the plant generated posi-
tive revenues abroad in the year prior to acquisition. Seventy acquired plants (accounting for 17,539 
stayers) report positive exports prior to the takeover event.
Table 6 displays the wage effects for workers employed by initial exporters and non-exporters. 
Our results indicate that the wage premium is not significantly different between workers employed 
by exporters and non-exporters. Dividing the sample by skill groups shows that we observe the same 
ranking of wage premia as in our baseline specification, that is high-skilled workers receiving the 
highest premium and low-skilled workers the lowest one. From the results in Table 6, we therefore 
conclude that the estimated wage premia do not pick up an exporter effect.
Summing up, our estimation results illustrate that rent appropriation (Heyman et al., 2011), tech-
nology protection (Glass & Saggi, 2002) and training on technology (Fosfuri et al., 2001; Görg et 
al., 2007) are relevant channels for explaining the wage effects of foreign takeover in German plants. 
However, a single hypothesis does not explain the whole pattern of the observed wage effects and our 
finding of a positive impact and a lagged adjustment effect therefore suggests that different theoretical 
hypotheses have to be combined to better understand wage effects of foreign acquisition. As discussed, 
platform investment to access Eastern European markets may also be an important motive for foreign 
T A B L E  5  The foreign ownership wage premium with process innovation
 
All workers Low-skilled Medium-skilled High-skilled
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Acquisition t = 1 0.027* 0.018 0.013 0.097***
  (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.036)
Acquisition t = 2 0.057*** 0.014 0.039*** 0.168***
  (0.014) (0.021) (0.014) (0.034)
Acquisition t = 3 0.045** 0.009 0.034* 0.120***
  (0.019) (0.024) (0.019) (0.035)
Process innovation × acquisition t = 1 0.016 0.015 0.022 0.025
  (0.019) (0.020) (0.018) (0.044)
Process innovation × acquisition t = 2 −0.017 −0.006 −0.011 0.007
  (0.020) (0.026) (0.018) (0.047)
Process innovation × acquisition t = 3 0.021 0.020 0.021 0.086*
  (0.025) (0.030) (0.024) (0.047)
Constant 4.780*** 4.641*** 4.763*** 5.062***
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008)
Observations 199,384 28,368 148,352 22,664
Notes: Dependent variable is the log daily wage. The estimation includes time dummies and worker-fixed effects. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the establishment-level. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.
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takeover. However, there is no evidence from our analysis that we falsely attribute an exporter pre-
mium to a foreign ownership effect.
Whereas we consider different channels for explaining the wage premium of foreign takeover 
above, lacking the necessary data we cannot shed light on two further channels that may be similarly 
important. The first one is rooted in a general rent-sharing argument, stressing that employers as 
well as employees benefit from increasing profits. In a study for the UK, Conyon, Girma, Thompson, 
and Wright (2004) shows that mergers lead to higher profitability and higher wages, providing sup-
port for this argument in the context of acquisitions. However, they exclude international mergers 
from their data set. Rent sharing in the context of international ownership has been put forward by 
Budd, Konings, and Slaughter (2005) who provide evidence for international rent sharing in multi-
national firms. According to their results, wages in German plants should increase if the acquiring 
firm has higher profits than its target. Egger and Kreickemeier (2013) additionally shows that inter-
national rent sharing can rationalise evidence on residual wage premia in the context of North–
South investment.13
A second channel we cannot address in this paper is the changing demand for skill types after 
foreign takeover, which can be an important factor for explaining the skill bias in the wage effects 
reported in Table 2. Hummels, Jørgensen, Munch, and Xiang (2014) show a differential effect of off-
shoring on skilled and unskilled workers in Danish firms and argue that such a differential effect can 
exist if firms face skill-specific, upward-sloping labour supply curves. Egger, Kreickemeier, Moser, 
and Wrona (2019) elaborate on this argument in a general equilibrium framework with monopsonistic 
13 Relying on Chinese data, Greaney and Li (2017) find support that foreign-owned plants pay higher wages because of 
rent-sharing and to reduce worker turnover.
T A B L E  6  The foreign ownership wage premium for exporters
 
All workers Low-skilled Medium-skilled High-skilled
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Acquisition t = 1 0.057*** 0.038* 0.049** 0.132***
  (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.028)
Acquisition t = 2 0.053*** 0.010 0.045** 0.157***
  (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.041)
Acquisition t = 3 0.064*** 0.036* 0.055** 0.157***
  (0.021) (0.019) (0.023) (0.031)
Exporter × acquisition t = 1 −0.023 −0.010 −0.025 −0.029
  (0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.040)
Exporter × acquisition t = 2 −0.015 −0.002 −0.023 0.013
  (0.023) (0.025) (0.021) (0.053)
Exporter × acquisition t = 3 −0.002 −0.013 −0.005 0.033
  (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.048)
Constant 4.780*** 4.641*** 4.763*** 5.062***
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009)
Observations 199,384 28,368 148,352 22,664
Notes: Dependent variable is the log daily wage. The estimation includes time dummies and worker-fixed effects. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the establishment-level. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.
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labour market competition and demonstrate that in such a setting one can also explain that a major 
part of vertical foreign investment is observed between similar countries. However, due to not having 
information on the acquirer's profitability and lacking the data necessary to estimate labour supply at 
the firm-level, we cannot further analyse these two additional channels.
5 |  EXTENSIONS
Section 4 documents a sizeable effect on wages in the year after foreign takeover as well as evidence 
for a lagged adjustment effect, suggesting additional wage growth in later years for medium- and 
high-skilled workers. There are two possible interpretations of the lagged adjustment in wages. On 
the one hand, additional positive wage effects may arise because it takes some time before the full 
effect of ownership change materialises—for instance, due to increased training in the period right 
after ownership change (see Fosfuri et al., 2001; Görg et al., 2007). On the other hand, the lagged 
adjustment in wages is also consistent with the idea that foreign takeover does not only increase the 
level but also the growth rate of wages.
To discriminate between these two interpretations, we expand the time window around the owner-
ship change to 6 years. Expanding the observation window reduces the number of takeover events to 
50 and the number of treated stayers to 9,289. It also somewhat increases the mean standardised bias 
of matching. Still, this exercise has the advantage of showing a more long-run perspective of wage ad-
justments due to ownership change. Table 7 reports the results and shows that—despite the reduction 
in the number of observations—the general picture regarding the effects of foreign takeover on wages 
in the first 3 years after ownership change remains by and large unaffected. Furthermore, looking at 
periods four and five after ownership change reveals that the wage growth is temporary and washes out 
after 4 years. For low- and medium-skilled workers, we even observe a decline in the estimated wage 
T A B L E  7  The foreign ownership wage premium over 5 years
 
All workers Low-skilled Medium-skilled High-skilled
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Acquisition t = 1 0.055*** 0.060*** 0.043** 0.135***
  (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.032)
Acquisition t = 2 0.063*** 0.041* 0.047*** 0.219***
  (0.017) (0.022) (0.015) (0.043)
Acquisition t = 3 0.095*** 0.065*** 0.080*** 0.251***
  (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.038)
Acquisition t = 4 0.117*** 0.071** 0.103*** 0.300***
  (0.026) (0.029) (0.025) (0.037)
Acquisition t = 5 0.100*** 0.050 0.081** 0.323***
  (0.035) (0.040) (0.034) (0.067)
Constant 4.799*** 4.679*** 4.786*** 5.075***
  (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.017)
Observations 111,468 15,468 85,188 10,812
Notes: Dependent variable is the log daily wage. The estimation includes time dummies and worker-fixed effects. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the establishment-level. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.
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premium after 4 years. High-skilled workers receive a higher wage premium in t = 5 as compared to 
t = 4, but the estimates do not differ significantly, indicating that the wage premia for high-skilled 
workers also stop increasing after 4 years. This suggests that foreign takeover affects the level and not 
the growth rate of wages, with the level effect requiring about 4 years before materialising fully.
Another question related to the timing of wage effects recently addressed by Javorcik and Poelhekke 
(2017, p. 501) is whether the benefit from foreign ownership is ‘due to a one-time knowledge transfer 
or [due to] continuous injections of knowledge.’ To rephrase the question in our context: Are higher 
wages due to foreign ownership temporary or do they persist and continue to exist even after foreign 
investors sell back domestic plants? To elaborate on this question, we investigate the wage effect of 
foreign divestments, that is (re-)acquisitions of foreign-owned plants by German investors. During 
the sample period, we identify 97 foreign divestments with 8,752 stayers. Using our propensity-score 
matching approach with employees in continuously foreign-owned plants as controls, we can estimate 
an equation similar to (2) to shed light on the effect of foreign divestments.
Column (1) in Table 8 shows that foreign divestment does not have a significant effect on wages. 
The estimates in column (2) suggest that low-skilled workers are worse off after foreign divestment. 
However, the wage loss is small and only significant in t = 2. Medium- and high-skilled wages are 
not affected significantly in any period. Overall, these results imply that at least for medium- and 
high-skilled workers the positive wage effect of foreign ownership does not vanish within 3 years after 
takeover by a domestic owner.
The results in Table 8 also indicate that the wage premia reported in Table 2 are due to foreign take-
over and not the result of a general acquisition effect. To further elaborate on this finding, we consider 
as a Placebo test takeovers of West German plants by East or West German investors. Thereby, we use 
the IAB Establishment Panel to identify whether the majority owner of an establishment is from West 
or East Germany and classify a German takeover as an event, in which ownership in two consecutive 
years switches from West German to East German or vice versa. We identify 81 intra-German take-
overs with 2,721 stayers over our sample period. The matching for this placebo is similarly successful 
as for our main specification. Table 9 presents the results.
To the extent that our estimates so far only capture a general takeover effect, stayers in domes-
tic-acquired establishments should experience a wage increase similar to stayers in foreign-acquired 
establishments. However, Table 9 shows that this is clearly not the case. For low- and high-skilled 
T A B L E  8  The wage effect of foreign divestments
 
All workers Low-skilled Medium-skilled High-skilled
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Divestment t = 1 −0.005 −0.014 0.000 −0.028
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.023)
Divestment t = 2 0.002 −0.021* 0.007 0.001
  (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.034)
Divestment t = 3 0.008 −0.014 0.009 0.036
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.037)
Constant 4.778*** 4.578*** 4.769*** 5.127***
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.010)
Observations 70,016 11,640 50,328 8,048
Notes: Dependent variable is the log daily wage. The estimation includes time dummies and worker-fixed effects. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the establishment-level. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.
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workers, we find no significant effect of a German takeover. Medium-skilled workers even lose from 
a takeover by a German investor after 2 years. Summing up, the insignificant and negative coefficients 
in Table 9 support the findings from foreign divestment that the wage premia in Table 2 do not capture 
a general takeover, but rather a genuine foreign takeover effect.
To ensure that our results are robust to changing the set of covariates used for matching, we control 
for three additional variables in the propensity-score estimation. The first one is a dummy variable that 
is one if the establishment has already existed prior to 1990. This dummy controls for selection of 
older targets by foreign investors, which can pay higher wages because they are already well-estab-
lished in the market (see Heyman et al., 2007). As a second matching variable, we add a dummy that 
is one if wages paid by the establishment are subject to collective labour agreements. Accounting for 
this dummy helps ruling out a selection bias because foreign investors aim to avoid wage pressure 
from unions.14 As a final control variable, we add the share of female workers because recent research 
by Vahter and Masso (2018) suggests that foreign investors require stronger commitment and higher 
flexibility from workers, which potentially leads to selection of establishments with fewer women, 
who might be less flexible due to family responsibilities. We compute the share of female workers in 
t = 0 as the share of females among the total workforce in an establishment. If foreign investors ac-
quire establishments, which are older, covered by collective agreements and/or employ an below-av-
erage share of women, our matching would suffer from omitted variable bias when not controlling for 
these covariates.15
Table 10 shows the results after adding the three additional matching variables and confirms our 
initial findings. Thus, selection by firm age, coverage by collective agreements or gender composition 
does not drive our results. Matching with a more extensive set of covariates leaves the initial ranking 
of wage premia unaffected. Moreover, the wage premia are similar in size, ranging from 2.8 to 10.7 
log points in the period after takeover and 2.7 to 17.4 log points after 3 years.
14 The turmoil after the takeover of the German automotive supplier Grohmann Engineering by Tesla is a prominent example 
in this case.
15 Despite adding three new covariates, matching is similarly successful as in our main specification. The mean standardised 
bias slightly increases to 6.5%, while normalised differences are smaller than one quarter for all covariates.
T A B L E  9  The wage premium from intra-German takeovers
 
All workers Low-skilled Medium-skilled High-skilled
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Acquisition t = 1 −0.004 −0.003 −0.009 0.023
  (0.012) (0.018) (0.012) (0.025)
Acquisition t = 2 −0.022* −0.017 −0.027** −0.003
  (0.012) (0.023) (0.013) (0.033)
Acquisition t = 3 −0.050 −0.088 −0.047 0.003
  (0.036) (0.070) (0.031) (0.027)
Constant 4.366*** 4.298*** 4.351*** 4.581***
  (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.009)
Observations 21,736 4,424 14,896 2,416
Notes: Dependent variable is the log daily wage. Estimation includes relative time dummies and controls for worker-fixed effects. 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the establishment-level. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, 
respectively.
   | 319EGGER Et al.
In a further extension reported in Table 11, we refine our matching approach by introducing a cal-
iper of 0.05. This implies that stayers are matched to controls only within a range of 0.05 of their re-
spective propensity scores and excludes observations for which no match is found within this range.16
Table 11 confirms our baseline results that foreign takeover leads to an immediate wage increase 
for all workers. The reported coefficients vary between 2.1 and 12.2 log points in t = 1 and 1.5 to 18.7 
log points in t = 3 and are comparable in size to the estimates relying on nearest-neighbour matching 
without a caliper reported in Table 2. However, the estimated low-skilled wage premium in period 
t = 3 is no longer significant. Overall, we nonetheless conclude that the finding of a significant foreign 
ownership wage premium is robust to refinements of the matching procedure.17
6 |  CONCLUSION
This paper provides new evidence on the foreign ownership wage premium from a large German 
employer–employee data set. Using information on ownership change of German establishments, 
16 The standardised bias of caliper matching is 6.1%, and normalised differences are less than 0.13 for all variables. The 
number of establishments subject to foreign takeover remains unaffected, whereas the number of treated workers falls to 
21,857, which implies a decrease by 3,066 observations.
17 The finding of a significant foreign ownership wage premium also remains unchanged when conducting matching with 
replacement, when matching separately for each skill group or after excluding workers lacking reliable education information. 
Since we cannot rule out that plants in the control group are multinationals themselves, our estimated wage premia may be 
compressed due to a comparison of foreign-owned multinationals with domestic-owned multinationals. To make sure that this 
is not the case, we have conducted a robustness check, in which we confine the control group to standalone plants only. This 
modification does hardly affect our results and is available upon request. Furthermore, the results are robust to including 
part-time workers or to restricting the sample to establishments with more than ten full-time workers, which is the threshold at 
which employment protection legislation in Germany limits the scope of establishments to lay off workers.
T A B L E  1 0  Additional matching covariates
 
All workers Low-skilled Medium-skilled High-skilled
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Acquisition t = 1 0.037*** 0.028** 0.028*** 0.107***
  (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.022)
Acquisition t = 2 0.038*** 0.011 0.024** 0.165***
  (0.012) (0.015) (0.010) (0.028)
Acquisition t = 3 0.060*** 0.027* 0.049*** 0.174***
  (0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.030)
Constant 4.757*** 4.626*** 4.740*** 5.031***
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009)
Observations 199,496 28,400 148,432 22,664
Notes: Nearest-neighbour propensity-score matching includes a dummy indicating if the plant has already existed prior to 1990, a 
dummy for workers under collective labour agreements and the establishment share of females in addition to baseline covariates 
in Table A1. The dependent variable in the difference-in-difference estimation is the log daily wage. The estimation includes time 
dummies and worker-fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the establishment-level. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.
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we observe 152 foreign takeover events over the period 2003 to 2014. To identify a causal effect of 
foreign acquisition, we combine propensity-score matching with a difference-in-difference estima-
tor. We then analyse workers' wages in the year after ownership change as well as in two subsequent 
periods to distinguish impact effects from lagged adjustment effects. Similar to previous studies, we 
conduct our analysis at the worker level and consider employees staying in the same establishment 
over a four-year window around ownership change.
Based on this data set, we provide evidence for the existence of a foreign ownership wage premium 
in the year after takeover. On average, this wage premium amounts to 4.0 log points and varies con-
siderably by skill group. We find evidence for a lagged adjustment effect, in particular for medium- 
and high-skilled workers. Moreover, high-skilled workers experience the highest wage stimulus from 
ownership change over the whole observation period. In further estimations, we distinguish possible 
explanations for the existence of a foreign ownership wage premium. We find support for the rent 
appropriation by managers hypothesis, the technology protection hypothesis and the training on new 
technology hypothesis. We also show that the wage premium is of similar size for initial exporters and 
non-exporters, indicating that our results do not falsely pick up an exporter wage premium. Expanding 
the observation window around takeover events reveals that foreign takeover increases the level but 
not the growth rate of wages, with the level effect requiring roughly 4  years before materialising 
fully. We also show that the wage gains from a foreign takeover are persistent and do not vanish after 
divestment. In a placebo test, we analyse takeovers by German investors and show that intra-German 
takeovers—if at all—affect wages negatively. Finally, we also document that our results are robust to 
changes in the matching procedure.
Drawing a nuanced picture of the foreign ownership wage premium, we think that our results are 
of interest to policymakers, who set the rules and conditions for foreign investment. In this respect, our 
finding that workers' positions in the hierarchy of establishments explain part of the wage premium is 
disconcerting, as it suggests that foreign takeover gives the management of acquired establishments 
scope for rent appropriation. At the same time, it is comforting that the wage increase after foreign take-
over seems to be persistent and is not eliminated when the foreign owner decides to sell back the plant 
to German investors. Moreover, we believe that distinguishing immediate impact and lagged adjustment 
effects of foreign takeover within a single framework is a promising avenue for future research.
T A B L E  1 1  The foreign ownership wage premium with caliper matching
 
All workers Low-skilled Medium-skilled High-skilled
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Acquisition t = 1 0.036*** 0.021* 0.024** 0.122***
  (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.030)
Acquisition t = 2 0.035*** −0.005 0.020** 0.173***
  (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.035)
Acquisition t = 3 0.057*** 0.015 0.043*** 0.187***
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.037)
Constant 4.752*** 4.611*** 4.735*** 5.033***
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012)
Observations 174,856 25,240 128,704 20,912
Notes: Propensity-score matching is conducted with a caliper of 0.05. The dependent variable in the difference-in-difference 
estimation is the log daily wage. The estimation includes time dummies and worker-fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are 
clustered at the establishment-level. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.
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APPENDIX 
T A B L E  A 1  Balancing test for the matching procedure
Variable Sample
Mean
Stand. 
bias %
Bias 
reduction
Normal 
diff.Treated Control
(a) Plant characteristics
Log employment Unmatched 6.841 6.982 –8.3    
Log employment Matched 6.841 6.569 16.0 –92.3 0.133
ΔLog employment Unmatched −0.012 0.009 −17.3    
ΔLog employment Matched −0.012 −0.013 0.4 97.6 0.002
Profitability Unmatched 0.580 0.531 9.8    
Profitability Matched 0.580 0.555 5.0 49.2 0.035
Manufacturing Unmatched 0.758 0.681 17.1    
Manufacturing Matched 0.758 0.783 –5.6 67.2 −0.041
Construction Unmatched 0.005 0.031 −19.2    
Construction Matched 0.005 0.008 –2.2 88.5 −0.025
Trade and repair Unmatched 0.051 0.076 −10.3    
Trade and repair Matched 0.051 0.045 2.1 79.3 0.017
Services and finance Unmatched 0.180 0.183 –1.0    
Services and finance Matched 0.180 0.157 5.9 −498.3 0.041
Lower Saxony Unmatched 0.173 0.136 10.5    
Lower Saxony Matched 0.173 0.149 6.8 35.0 0.048
North Rhine-Westphalia Unmatched 0.094 0.231 –37.9    
North Rhine-Westphalia Matched 0.094 0.107 –3.6 90.4 −0.031
Hesse Unmatched 0.217 0.072 42.0    
Hesse Matched 0.217 0.203 3.9 90.7 0.022
Rhineland-Palatinate Unmatched 0.042 0.073 −13.5    
Rhineland-Palatinate Matched 0.042 0.054 –5.2 61.5 −0.040
Baden-Württemberg Unmatched 0.278 0.137 35.3    
Baden-Württemberg Matched 0.278 0.312 –8.3 76.5 −0.051
Bavaria Unmatched 0.104 0.265 −42.5    
Bavaria Matched 0.104 0.086 4.5 89.4 0.041
Berlin Unmatched 0.028 0.022 3.9    
Berlin Matched 0.028 0.021 4.3 –9.5 0.031
(b) Worker characteristics
Log Wage Unmatched 4.779 4.761 4.1    
Log Wage Matched 4.779 4.782 –0.5 86.8 −0.006
Age Unmatched 41.3 41.3 –0.7    
Age Matched 41.3 41.3 –0.4 43.6 −0.003
Female Unmatched 0.187 0.197 –2.7    
(Continues)
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Variable Sample
Mean
Stand. 
bias %
Bias 
reduction
Normal 
diff.Treated Control
Female Matched 0.187 0.180 1.6 40.6 0.012
Medium skill Unmatched 0.744 0.759 –3.6    
Medium skill Matched 0.744 0.740 1.0 71.5 0.007
High skill Unmatched 0.114 0.117 –1.2    
High skill Matched 0.114 0.120 –2.1 –73.4 −0.014
Sample       Mean bias Median bias  
Unmatched       14.8 10.3  
Matched       4.2 3.9  
Notes: All variables are measured in t = 0 and averaged at the worker level in the treated and control group, respectively. Due to 
the low number of takeovers in small Federal States, we assign the city state of Bremen to Lower Saxony, Saarland to Rhineland-
Palatinate and the city state of Hamburg to Schleswig-Holstein. The omitted Federal State is Schleswig-Holstein including Hamburg; 
the omitted sector is agriculture, hunting and forestry.
T A B L E  A 1  (Continued)
